In their important paper [3] , Peferman and Vaught show, as a consequence of a stronger result, that many of the usual product operations preserve elementary equivalence. For example, if 2ti, 3l 2 , ϊ& L , 95 2 are structures such that 3U and ^ have the same elementary first order properties (denoted SU Ξ= SS^ and similarly SX 2 = 35 2 , then for the direct products we have % x Sl 2 = SBj . x 33 2 . In the footnote on page 76 of that paper they state that their methods do not apply to free products or tensor products, and they ask if these two operations preserve elementary equivalence. The answer is known to be negative for tensor products (see [2] , [4] ). We show here that for free products the answer is also negative for both elementaryequivalence and elementary subsystem. In our counterexample %, St 2 , S5i, S3 2 are semigroups, and the idea used is similar to the idea in Example 1.3 of [5] .
In that same footnote, Feferman and Vaught mention a method due to Fraϊsse and later developed by Ehrenfeucht [1] , and they ask if this method might by applied to the problem of preserving elementary equivalence. We show here, using this method of games of Fraϊsse-Ehrenfeucht, that the free product operation on groupoids preserves both elementary equivalence and elementary subsystem. A groupoid is simply a nonempty set with a binary function.
Also explicitly mentioned in that footnote is the question whether free products of groups preserve elementary equivalence. We have been unable to answer this question.
It should be noted that the definition of free product depends on the class of structures considered, so that if 2t and 33 are semigroups then their free product as semigroups is different from the free product formed with them by thinking of them as groupoids. At the end of the paper we attempt in a short space to give some motivation for the example and the proof.
The results of this paper were announced in [6] . We denote the sentence ψ being true in the model SX by 5t 1= φ. If for every elementary first order sentence φ we have 211= Ψ iff S3t=^ then SI and S3 are said to be elementarily equivalent and Then 21 is obtained by starting with the free semigroup on the set G of generators and then introducing the relations in R.
Since the only relations which we have added to the free semigroup on G are of a "commuting" nature and in particular introduce no cancellation or reduction in the length of words, several properties follow. First, the indivisible members of 21 are exactly the members of G; i.e., the formula ~(3x ι )(3x 2 )(x 1 x % =x) f denoted by ψ(x), is satisfied in 21 by, and only by, the members of G. Also, every member of 21 is either indivisible or can be written as an indivisible times some other element; i.e.,
The formula "says" of x that it is indivisible and for any y lf * ,y n there is an indivisible z such that, for each i, if y t is indivisible then Z'X yi ~ yi z x. 2t was constructed in such a way that 2t μ <P n (a n ), the desired z being , g m all different will suffice. But the set of formulas T = { ζ Pn{%)}n<ω is finitely satisfiable in 21 because, given any finite subset T of T, if n is the largest integer such that φ n e T then clearly a n satisfies all the members of ϊ 7 '. By the Compactness Theorem for elementary first order logic there is a semigroup 21' such that 21' is denumerably infinite, 21' > 21, and there is some αe2l' such that for each n < α>, 21' |= φ n (ά).
We will now show that S3 * 21 and S3 * 21' are not elementarily equivalent and hence S3 * 21 is not an elementary subsystem of 33 * 21'. Let θ be the sentence
This sentence θ, as it will be applied below, says roughly the following: There is an idempotent (which will have to be δ) and an indivisible x such that for any word y we can find an indivisible z such that for any way of writing y as u x b u 2 b u z with u 2 e A or e A' (as the case may be), there is a left-most indivisible factor w of u 2 such that z x w=w z x. We are using here the fact that S3* 21 |= ~(3^4)(3% 5 )(w = u 4 b u δ ) iff ueA, and similarly with A f in place of A.
We claim S3 * 21' t= θ and S3 * 21 t= -0. First, why S3 * 21'|= 0? Let v be 6 e S3 and let x be the a e 21'. ψ^(α) holds in S3 * 21' because a satisfies φ^x) in 21'. Now suppose y e S3 * 21' is given. We can assume y is of the form h t 6 t x 6 ί 2 We now wish to show S3 * 21 N ~ θ. Suppose not. So we get v and x. Since v v = v we must have v = b since b is the only idempotent in S3 * 21. Since S3 * 21 |= Ψ(%) we must have x -geG.
As remarked above, there is an m and g l9
, g m e G such that for any
δ βr» δ. So we then get z. Since SB * 2L (= ^(z), we must have z e G; say z = #\ Say i 0 is such that g' g g H Φ g io * g' g. If 1 < i 0 < m, let w 2 be g io , let ^ be 6 -flΓi -6 6 # ίo _i and let u 3 be # We remark that in the logical hierarchy of formulas, θ is a IVsentence. It seems likely that an example showing that free products do not preserve elementary equivalence could be constructed in which the sentence θ is Σ 4 , or perhaps Σ s . It also seems likely that Σ z or at least Σ 2 equivalence is preserved by free products, and the method of games of the next result should suffice to show it.
A groupoid 21 = <A, •> is a nonempty set A and a function from A x A into A; and * is now in the class of groupoids. We wish to show that if 2^, 2t 2 , S3 X , S5 2 are groupoids, 2t L Ξ= S^, 2t 2 = 33 2 , then 2t x * 2t 2 = 33 X * S5 2 . The method to be used is the method of games [1] , [2] , and the winning strategy for player II is similar to that which is used in showing that, as linearly ordered sets, a)Ξ=ω + ω* + ω. We wish to thank the referee whose questions and comments led to, among other things, improvement in the proof of the following theorem.
THEOREM. // 2t x , 2l 2 , S^, S3 2 are groupoids and % Ξ= S^, 2t 2 Ξ 33 2 then % * 2t 2 = ^ * 33 2 .
Proof. We can assume A 1 Π A 2 = B λ Π JB 2 -0. Let % be a fixed positive integer. We will describe a winning strategy for player II in the game G Λ (Sl 1 * 2t 2 , S^ * 35 2 ). We can assume that the nonlogical constants of the language are only = (interpreted always as identity) and a three-place predicate P, where P(α, 6, c) means a b -c. This allows us to avoid considering terms. In the game, x x, 2 
x,
, n x will be chosen from SX L * 2L 2 and 1 y 1 2 y, * , n y from SB^SSa II wins iff for all 1 ^ i 9 j, k ^ n iX jx = fc α; iff ,1/ # = fc i/ and t x = ,-a? iff t y = ^ . We shall need IΓs winning strategy in G m (U u 2) . A similar procedure is followed for such factors from A 2 and B 2 . If I had chosen $, again the procedure is similar. The method II uses for completing his choice of factors of x y (if x y is not already completely defined) will be specified later. It will not affect some parts of his later strategy, which it is convenient to give now. Say I chooses 2 y. Consider those factors t y{ of t y which are in B x U B 2 and with j ^ S n~t+1 -i.e., those just specified by II. Conditions K t (l) and 1^(3) might require some t y% equal or unequal to some r y c d , r < t and a + c -1 ^ %*-*+i f and this in turn might mean that there is a factor tVi oί tVb, which is a member of B x U B 2 , has j ^ g"-^1 (and thus was specified by II already) and which, if we are to have t yl equal or unequal to r y e d , will have to be equal or unequal (as the case may be) to r y{\, which is a factor of τ y\ and a member of B x U B 2 . Is this equality or inequality, needed for K t (ί) or ^(3), satisfied? Assume it is equality we need. We have a + c -1 ^3 %~ί+1 , j ^ 3 n~t + 1 and o -2ι = a -j. So j\ = c + i -α <^ c + i. But c ^ c + α -1 <;3 %~ί+1 . So i x ^ S n~t+1 + 3 %~ί+1 ^ 3^-(*-1 )+ 1 ^ 3 " r+1 . Hence r^ and r y{\ were "earlier moves" in the games G m being played and so, since t x% = r x c d and thus t x{ = ^i^, player II, as required by his winning strategies in the games G m , chose t y{ -r y{\. We have shown that the part of IΓs strategy already given does not conflict with conditions K t (l) and K t (S). The check that there is also no conflict with K t (2) and K t (4) is simpler and we do not give it.
We will now show how the rest (if any) of t y is to be defined by II. Let t x{\, •••, t x 3 k p be a list of those factors of t x which satisfy the hypothesis of condition K t (l) and such that no member of this list is a factor in t x of any other (and hence there is no "overlap" among them at all, in the sense that they have no factors in common). It follows that every t x{ which (together with some 8 x{',, s < t) satisfies the hypothesis of K t {l) is a factor of one of the members of this list.
Say t x{\ = r xi, r < t, j\ + i - (ϊ) . Since t y{ has just been defined (since it is a piece of t yi\), does it satisfy the conclusion of iff(l)? We have j + a -1 ^ 3 w~ί+1 . We require ^j = 4/J. Since t x{\ = r x\ and since they have exactly the same form, let t x*, be that factor of r x\ which corresponds to t x{ under the correspondence given by this "sameness of form". Of course r x», = t x{ and V -ί = j -j t . In the same way, tVί = r2/ί-But α + j\ + (i -iθ -1 = a + j -1 ^ 3"-ί+1 and this im- Player II now repeats the above procedure for t x{\ on t x{\, , t x{%. Since, as remarked above, no two of these overlap there is no difficulty in making the definitions to satisfy K t (ϊ); and again as above, factors of members of this list are automatically taken care of.
We now wish to consider condition K t (2) . Suppose t x{\ and t x{\ satisfy the hypothesis of K t (2) (i.e., they are equal and ii+i 2 -1^3 %~ί+1 ). Suppose further that there is no pair of factors of t χ satisfying the hypothesis of K t (2) and with either of these factors being factors of t x{\ or of t x{\ -i.e., this latter pair is "minimal" with respect to the hypothesis of ^(2). If there are any pairs satisfying the hypothesis of K t (2) then there is a minimal pair because: If M\, t%i\ and t xi\, t x{\ are different pairs satisfying the hypothesis of Kt (2) and if t x{\ is a factor of t x{\ then if t x{\ were a factor of t x{\, we would get t x{\ equal to a proper factor of itself and this is impossible in a free product. So we can "work our way down in depth" and consider a minimal pair t x{\, t x{\. Player II must arrange t y{\ = t y{\. There are several ways in which the parts of t y defined in satisfying K t (l) might conflict with this desired result.
Suppose t y{, -r yt, ϊ + f ~ 1 ^ 3 n~t+1 , r < ί, and t y{'. = t y$, j" + i" -1 ^ S n~t+ \ s <t were arranged in satisfying K t (l) 2 ) image in t y{\. Player II then defines those t yl which are factors of t yί\, which are required to be in B ι U B 2 , and which are not already defined, by making them equal to the corresponding (same correspondence) factors in t y{\, all of which were defined earlier.
Now suppose things are as above, except t yζ, is a factor of t y{\ and t y%. is a factor of t y{\. There are now several subcases to consider, depending on how these factors overlap under the correspondence determined by t x{\ being equal to t x j k \. All of them involve computations similar to the one given above, and we omit them. Once the definitions made in satisfying K t (l) are seen not to conflict with t y{\ being equal to t y{\, II can define those factors of, say, t y{\ which are to be in B 1 U B 2 and which are supposed to equal factors already defined in t y{\. One possibility remains. A certain factor of t y{\ is to be a member of B λ U B 2 and equal to its corresponding factor in t y{\-but neither has been defined by any of the above considerations. In this case we use the assumption that B x and B 2 are each infinite, and II chooses any member (from B x or B 2 , whichever is needed so that t y and t x will have the same form) which is completely new -i.e., which appears nowhere in x x y ••-,*#, d/, •• , t _ 1 ί/ and that part of t y so far defined. This completes the definition of t yί\ and t y{\.
Other minimal pairs satisfying the hypothesis of K t (2) are handled similarly. We then consider pairs which are minimal in the sense above, but with respect only to those pairs not yet considered. The arguments are analogous, and II proceeds to define as much of t y as is required to satisfy K t (2) .
We have thus defined part of t y and at the same time shown that K t (l) and K t (2) (2) and K k (4: ) ensured that, when k x and k y were chosen, we had k x\ = k x\ iff k yl = jbi/i. Then, as in case (i) above, conditions K^l) and JK<(3) ensure i« = k %l = *a?l iff *2/? = *2/i = i2/ The other cases are no more difficult.
REMARK. For any positive integer n, let m be defined (as a function of n) as in the proof of the above theorem. Let Ξ p mean equivalence with respect to sentences with at most p variables. Then in fact the above proof shows that:
(1) if 2U 3t» %, SS 2 , are all infinite, %= m ί& lf ai 2ΞΞm <δ 2 , then a,*?!,^^*^.
(2) if a x = 33i, 2t 2 and S5 2 are infinite, and a a = w S3 2 then 5^*21, =.»,*»,.
It seems likely that these last results could be strengthened -in particular by weakening the hypotheses.
COROLLARY. Ifll lf 3X 2 , S^, 35 2 are groupoids, ll 2 < 23 2 , ^ •< 33^ then SU * 5>l 2 -<' S3, * 5B 2 .
The proof of the corollary is essentially the same as that for the theorem, except that we start with x x = x y, , p χ = p y for some fixed p < n, and the first part of IΓs strategy is modified to use IΓs winning strategy gotten from the games appropriate for % < â nd Sl 2 •< §B 2 .
What follows is a short attempt to motivate intuitively the above results. The major reason the preservation result is true for groupoids is that, because of the lack of an associative law, factors of an x 6 SI * 33 -(21 U S3) which are inside a sufficient number of brackets cannot be "connected" with x in a game with only n rounds. For example, to "state" that &{ is a factor of t x 9 player I would need at least j rounds. If G n is being played and n < j, player II knows that I cannot do it. So when t x, in the game G nf has been chosen, only members of the original groupoids at a depth ^ S n in x x are "threatened" by I; for the others it suffices that II maintain certain equalities and inequalities. However, for semigroups an element, say a λ b x a 2 b 2 a n b n in 21 * S3, does not depend on the bracketing. And the δ/s are all equally and quickly "accessible". Thus in round 1, player II commits himself to some choice and in round 2 player I can then present II with an arbitrarily large finite subset of elements, any one of which is accessible in 2 or 3 more rounds. The above counterexample for semigroups takes advantage of this, as well as the idea in Example 1.3 of [5] .
